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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, a
Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
JAMES PIEPENBERG,

Case No. 14 68 8

De fendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, James Piepenberg, was charged
with a violation of Salt Lake City's obscenity ordinances,
Section 32-2-10 et. seq., for displaying the motion picture,
"Memories Within Miss Aggie".
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendant was charged with a violation of
Section 32-2-10, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City and
convicted in the Salt Lake City Court.
by that court to pay a fine of $2 99.

He was sentenced
An appeal was taken

to the District Court where the matter was tried to a
jury before the Honorable Peter Leary and a verdict of
guilty was returned.

A motion in arrest of judgment and

for a new trial was made and denied and the defendant was
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sentenced to serve a sentence of not to exceed six months.
The trial court executed a certificate of probable cause
and execution of sentence was stayed pending this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction
below or, in the alternative, a remand for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The instant case was the fifth prosecution of
the defendant by Salt Lake City for violation of the City's
obscenity ordinances arising out of the defendant's displaying of "X-rated" motion pictures at an adults-only
theater in Salt Lake City.

The preceding four prosecutions

had terminated in the City Court in either acquittals or
dismissals.

The defendant admitted responsibility for

exhibiting the film and the only issue at trial was whether
the film was "obscene".
On the morning of the trial, it became known that
the Utah Attorney General's Office had conducted a background investigation of persons called as prospective
furors, utilizing, among other sources, officials of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.

(T-18)

Both the court and the city prosecutor indicated that if

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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any juror was aware of the investigation that there would
be a problem.

(T-4)

The court inquired of the prospective

jurors whether any contact had been made with them and
none indicated there had been.

The court admonished a

deputy attorney general in the presence of Robert Hansen
that if he had made a statement to a television reporter
and it was placed on the air it may cause a problem, and
that deputy indicated that he had already taken care of
the matter.

(T-18, 19)

At the next recess, Robert Hansen,

who was associated as counsel for the plaintiff, (T-27,28)
gave an interview to a reporter from a television station
describing the background investigation determining if
prospective jurors "were pro or anti-pornography" and
including the fact that bishops in the jurors' wards were
called.

Mr. Hansen also stated that five of the impaneled

jurors were favorable to the prosecution and two would
probably hold out for a hung jury.

(T-142)

These state-

ments were quoted on the 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. television
news broadcast of station KUTV, (T-142, Exhibit 13D) which
was viewed by four jurors and brought to the attention of
an additional juror.

(T-99)

These jurors indicated that

they would not be influenced by the story to the extent
that they would be unable to reach a fair and impartial
verdict.

(T-100)

-3-
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During the course of the trial two additional
jurors informed the court that they had been informed
of the investigation; Juror Pappas stating that a neighbor had informed her that the Attorney General's Office
had inquired as to whether she was a good girl or partied
a lot, (T-161) and Juror Wardle stating that his wife had
informed him that his ward secretary had called her and
indicated that someone had called asking questions about
him, including about his church attendance,

(T-162)

Motions for a mistrial, dismissal, and a new trial based
upon the defendant's right to an untainted jury were made
and denied.
The prosecution's case consisted of introducing
the film, "Memories Within Miss Aggie", into evidence
and exhibiting it to the jury and the testimony of three
experts on the issue of the artistic value of the film.
The City's first expert was a motion picture
cameraman who was employed by Brigham Young University and
also did freelance work on documentaries.

(T-77, 84)

He

testified that his "evaluation of the film is due to the
disproportionate treatment of certain explicit scenes, it
does not really render itself as a serious art piece, taken
as a whole."

(T-81)

.4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The City's second expert was a University of
Utah English professor (T-102) who, however, was testifying
as an expert on the philosophy of aesthetics rather than
as an expert on literature,

(T-112, 13)

He admitted

that his basic views were somewhat unique and that he was
trying to develop a new and consistent theory of aesthetics.
(T-121)

His opinion also was that the explicit sex scenes

were out of proportion to the overall theme causing the
audience to lose psychic distance and hence destroying
the artistic value.

The misproportion, in his view, was

a matter of time—"if the [sex] scene had been three
minutes or say a fairly short period of time . . . then
I think it would have made a legitimate point.ff

(T-107)

This witness was primarily concerned about whether the
theme, which he described as "sexual repression leads to
fantasy, delusion, psychosis, and results in violence"
justified the three sexually explicit scenes.

(T-104, 5)

He was of the opinion that these scenes were not adequately
integrated "to justify this as a great work of art, or
perhaps even as a serious work of art . . ."

(T-109)

He

saw "some difference in [the sexual scenes] because it
related to the theme of repression leads to psychosis or
whatever.
ones?"

But is that enough to justify the three divergent

(T-119)

In short, this witness believed that

-5-
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explicit se.x had to be justified.

He admitted that:

"There are parts of it—for instance the last twenty
minutes, which had nothing to do with sex—which I
thought would if taken by itself qualify as a very good
student production."

(T-116)

It should be noted that

the last twenty mintues of the film were about sex, but
the actors had their clothes on which apparently was
the test for "sex" used by this witness.

(See also T-116

where the witness times the sex scenes by the length of
time the actress was "exposed").
The City's final expert was a staff member of the
Utah State Division of Fine Arts and former teacher of film
appreciation at Brigham Young University.

His opinion

was the film lacked serious artistic value because:

7 ~

. . . there are elements [sexually
explicit scenes] in the film which
seem to me to be disproportionate;
that is to say, taken as a whole,
there are segments of the film which
somehow violate what seems to me to
be in other areas perhaps a serious
intent at perhaps some subtle ex~~ position of some serious psychological
concerns. (T-238)
The gist of this witness's testimony was that

the impact of the imagery of the sexual scenes was so
strong that they overwhelm the viewer causing the viewer
to lose the overall theme.

He testified that his experience

-6-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in watching the film was that the sexual scenes pulled
him "out of the film to the point of being self-conscious*"
(T-24 2)

He stated further that the personal feelings and

attitude of the audience is important in regard to the
impact of a film (T-237, 24 2) and that he regarded the
viewing of sexually explicit material as improper.

(T-241)

This witness conceded that the symbolism and other
literary and artistic intricacies described by the defense's
cinema critic were present in the film,

(T-240, 242)

The defense put on uncontested evidence that all
patrons were forwarned that the film contained sexually
explicit material and that admission was strictly limited
to persons over twenty-one years of age.
The defense attempted unsuccessfully to put
in evidence an opinion poll conducted to determine the
attitude of the people of the community toward motion
pictures containing explicit sexual material and two motion
pictures, which had been previously the subject of obscenity
prosecutions involving the same parties and where the sole
issue of the obscenity of the films had been resolved in
favor of the defendant.

(T-14 0, 150,51)

The great bulk of the evidence that the trial
court permitted the defendant to submit to the jury concerned
the artistic and literary value of the motion picture and,

-7-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

indirectly the issue of appeal to prurient interest.
Three expert witnesses testified that the film did have
serious literary and artistic value; a professor of English
literature and creative writing at the University of Utah
(T-168-92), a professor of fine arts at the University of
Utah who had eight years experience as a film maker for
national television (T-192-201), and a professional film
critic and teacher of film criticism at U.C.L.A. and the
University of Utah.

(T-201-235)

The last witness con-

ducted a "voice-over" critique of the film while it was
being displayed to the jury.

(T-207-224)

The film itself was extremely complex, utilizing
a great deal of symbolism, filmic references (creating
a particular mood in different scenes by emulating different
film makers associated with particular viewpoints) and
subtle variations in lighting and musical score. Approximately one-third of the film consisted of three separate
explicit scenes of ultimate sexual conduct, which if taken
out of context could be considered to be "pornography".
However, according to the defense experts, the overall
purpose and effect of the film was anti-erotic and the maker
of the film actually sacrificed erotic potential in order
to establish his theme (T-176, 177, 190, 204, 209, 225)
which was that the internalizing of sex by indulging in

-8-
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sexual fantasy, instead of incorporating it in a loving
relationship, leads to alienation, madness and ultimately
death rather than the natural life-producing function of
sex—hardly the sort of message to appeal to the prurient
interest of a viewer seeking sexual fantasy.

In other

words, the film maker used sexual explicitness to make
a point against the values usually associated with pornography much as a film maker might show explicit violence
in an anti-war film.
A reading of the testimony of all the experts makes
it obvious that the prosecution experts, and probably the
jury, were so shocked by the sexual explicitness, which
they regarded as per se immoral, that they did not see the
interrelationships between the scenes; whereas the defense
experts analyzed the use of sexual explicitness as they
would any other filmic device, such as violence or suspense,
to see if the purpose was to convey a message or just
titillate the audience.
ARGUJVENT
POINT I
SALT LAKE CITY'S OBSCENITY ORDINANCE ON ITS
FACE VIOLATES THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
A. Salt Lake City's Obscenity Ordinance
Violates The First Amendment Due To Its Overbreadth.
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In

State v, Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 (1975), at

least a plurality of this Court apparently held that the
provisions of the First Amendment to the United States do
not apply to the State of Utah which is not only in opposition to a long line of holdings of the Supreme Court of
the United States, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (.1973), but makes Utah the only jurisdiction within
the United States and its territories where residents are
ostensibly so unprotected.

It is respectfully submitted

that such holding be overturned.
In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct.
2607 (1973), the United States Supreme Court set forth
minimum standards that an obscenity statute must meet to
comply with the United States Constitution:
[W]e now confine the permissible
scope of [obscenity] regulation to
works which depict or describe
sexual conduct. That conduct must
be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or
authoritatively construed. A state
offense must also be limited to
works which, taken as a whole,
appeal to the prurient interest in
sex, which portray sexual conduct
in a patently offensive way, and
which, taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value. 413 U.S. at 24,
93 S.Ct. at 2614, 2615 (footnote
omitted.)
{

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Miller decision conceded that a state statute does not
need to repeat the Miller test verbatim.
did

require

However, the Court

that a statute or ordinance use words

sufficient to guarantee the protections inherent in the
test the Court set out.
Defendant is charged with exhibiting a movie in
a violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance §32-2-10(3).
(Section 32-2-10 is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix
A, infra.)

This ordinance does not approach compliance

with the minimum requirements of Miller.

Section 32-2-10

states:
It shall be unlawful for any person
to willfully or knowingly
either:
(3) . . .[E]xhibit . . . any . . .
motion picture . . . which depicts
or represents or describes obscene
sexual conduct, an obscene performance, obscenities or obscene sadomasochistic abuse with the intent to
distribute the same. [Emphasis
added.]
A careful reading of this section reveals that the exhibition of four distinct categories of motion pictures are
declared unlawful.

These are:

(a)

Pictures depicting "obscene sexual conduct".

(b)

Pictures depicting an "obscene performance".

(c)

Pictures depicting "obscenities".

(d)

Pictures depicting "obscene sado-masochistic
abuse".
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If the jury finds a violation of any one of these four
categories they can return a verdict of guilty.

The use

of commas and the word "or" in the ordinance make it clear
that a violation of any one of the four categories will

i

suffice for a conviction.
The terms "obscene performance" and "obscenities"
are specifically and individually defined in definitional
sections 32-2-10.1(3) and (9) respectively.

i

The terms

"obscene sexual conduct" and "obscene sado-masochistic
abuse" are not individually defined.

Rather, the term

<

"obscene" is defined in §32-2-10.1(14) and the terms "sexual
conduct" and "sado-masochistic abuse" are separately defined
in §32-2-10.1(12) and (10) respectively.

The definition of

i

the word "obscene" in §32-2-10.1(14) constitutes an intended,
but unsuccessful, repetition of the Miller three prong,
prurient interest, patently offensive, serious value test.
In part the impermissible overbreadth of the ordinance lies
in the fact that this test is not applied to the terms
"obscene performance" and "obscenities" which are separately
defined in §32-2-10.1 of the ordinance as follows:

•

(8) Obscene performance means a
. . . motion picture . . . which
in whole or in part depicts or
reveals nudity, sexual conduct,
sexual excitement or sado-masochistic abuse, or which includes

*

I
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obscenities or explicit verbal
description or narrative accounts of sexual conduct.
(9) Obscenities means those slang
words currently generally rejected
for regular use in mixed society,
that are used to refer to genitals,
female breasts, sexual conduct or
excretory functions or products,
either that have no other meaning
or that in context are clearly used
for their bodily, sexual or excretory meaning.
No mention is made in these definitions that a movie depicting an "obscene performance" or "obscenities" must
additionally be found obscene under §32-2-10.1(14) before
it can be found in violation of the law.

Thus, under the

ordinance, a jury need only base its decision on whether
a film depicts an "obscene performance" or "obscenities"
as defined in §32-2-10.1(3) and (9) respectively.

Standing

alone, there can be no question that these definitions are
overly broad restraints on First Amendment rights.
The ordinance's definition of "obscenities" [in
§32-2-10.1(9)] falls short on all counts of the Miller
three-pronged test.

First, there is no requirement under

the ordinance to look to the movie "as a whole" for an
"appeal to the prurient interest in sex".

Clearly, as an

example, excretory terms are not prima facie evidence of
an appeal to the prurient interest in sex.

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The second element of the Miller test lacking here

i

is that the film depict "sexual conduct" in a "patently
offensive" manner.

First, the utterance of an obscenity

is not necessarily a depiction of sexual conduct.

Secondly,

<

there is a great difference betv/een something being "patently
offensive" (required by Miller) and being "generally rejected
for regular use in mixed society" as stated in the Salt Lake

<

City Ordinance.
Finally, the Salt Lake City ordinance does not
protect movies in which obscenities exist but which have

{

"serious literary, artistic, political, or scientic value"*
As a result, a broad range of movies, clearly in the protected
*

area of free speech would be made illegal.
Salt Lake City's ban on movies depicting "obscenities" is clearly in violation of the minimum constitutional
standards set forth in Miller.

Under the present ordinance

there is a distinct possibility that a jury could find a
prima facie case of an exhibition of a movie depicting
obscenities without ever reaching the essential "Miller
test%>: v.,-,.
In addition to banning a film for depicting
i

"obscenities" the ordinance also prohibits the exhibition
of films depicting an "obscene performance".

However, the

ordinance's definition of "obscene performance" similarly
I
-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fails to comply with the constitutional requirements of
Miller.

Under §32-2-10.1(8) any depiction of nudity or

sexual conduct in a film is enough for it to be defined
as an "obscene performance".

The United States Supreme

Court has consistently struck down state statutes and
ordinances which ban nudity per se.

In Jenkins v. Georgia,

418 U.S. 153 (1974), a case in which the Court reversed a
conviction for showing the movie "Carnal Knowledge",
Justice Rehnquist speaking for the Court stated:
There are occasional scenes of nudity,
but nudity alone is not enough to make
materials legally obscene under the
Miller standards. 418 U.S. at 161,
94 S.Ct. at 2755.
One year later, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268 (1975), the Court declared a Jacksonville ordinance unconstitutional on its face in that it
barred drive-in theaters from showing any films containing
nudity.

The Court's opinion reveals the impermissible

effects of such an ordinance:
[The ordinance] sweepingly forbids
display of all films containing any
uncovered buttocks or breasts, irrespective of context or pervasiveness. Thus it would bar a film
containing a picture of a baby's
buttocks, the nude body of a war
victim, or scenes from a culture
in which nudity is indigenous. The
ordinance also might prohibit newsreel scenes of the opening of an
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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art exhibit as well as shots of
bathers on a beach. Clearly all
nudity cannot be deemed obscene
even as to minors. 422 U.S. at
213, 95 S.Ct. at 2274-75. (Emphasis
added.)
Salt Lake City has defined "nudity" in §32-2-10.1 (7)
as follows:
(7) Nudity means uncovered, or less
than opaquely covered, human genitals,
pubic areas, the human female breast
below a point immediately above the
top of the areola, or the covered
human male genitals in a discernibly
turgid state.
Thus, it is clear that the Salt Lake City ordinance is as
broad as that struck down in Erznoznik, supra.

If a city

cannot justify a ban on nudity at drive-in theaters, <a

{

fortiori a city certainly cannot justify a ban on nudity
applied against indoor theaters where minors are excluded.
A finding of an "obscene performance" need not

(

necessarily be based on a finding that a film contained
nudity.

Section 32-2-10.1(8) allows a jury to find an

"obscene performance" if any of the following are depicted,
either in whole or in part:

<

nudity, sexual conduct, sexual

excitement, sado-masochistic abuse, obscenities, or explicit
verbal description or narrative accounts of sexual conduct".

I

The Miller decision stated that mere proscription of "sexual
conduct" in movies is not enough for a finding that a film
is obscene.

*
-16-
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That case held that an obscenity statute must also be
limited to works which, taken as a whole, violate the
three-prong prurient interest, patently offensive, serious
value test.

No such limitation is placed on any of the

city ordinance grounds for finding an "obscene performance".
The stifling overbreadth of this portion of the ordinance
is illustrated by the definition of "sexual excitement" in
§32-2-10.1(13) (which, as mentioned above, is an adequate
independent ground for finding an "obscene performance").
(13) Sexual excitement means . . .
the sensual experiences of humans
engaging in or witnessing sexual
conduct or nudity.
The Salt Lake City ordinance bans movies depicting
either "obscenities" or an "obscene performance" and the
statutory definitions of these terms are broader than is
constitutionally permissible.

As a result, the ordinance

must be struck down in its entirety as unconstitutional
on its face.
Section 32-2-10(3) further purports to prohibit
depictions of obscene sexual conduct and obscene sado-masochistic abuse.

Such terms are defined in §§32-2-10.1(10)

and (12) as follows:
(10) Sado-masochistic abuse means
flagellation or torture by or upon
a person who is nude or clad in
undergarments or in revealing or
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bizarre costume, or the condition of
being fettered, bound or otherwise
physically restrained on the part of
one so clothed.
(12) Sexual conduct means human
masturbation, sexual intercourse,
or any touching of the covered or
uncovered genitals, human female
breast, pubic areas, or buttocks
of the human male or female, whether
alone or between members of the same
or opposite sex or between humans and
animals in an act of apparent sexual
stimulation or gratification, which
term shall include, but not be
limited to fellatio, cunnilingus,
pederasty and bestiality.
In the second part of the three-prong Miller
test, patently offensive portrayals of sexual conduct
specifically defined, the Court set forth guidelines
concerning the type of materials which could be regulated
as patently offensive representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, or patently offensive representations or descriptions
of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibitions
of the genitals.

The Court later, in Jenkins v. Georgia,

supra, at 160-61, said that while those guidelines were
"not an exhaustive catalog of what juries might find patently
offensive, it was certainly intended to fix substantive
constitutional limitations, deriving from the First Amendment,
of the type of material subject to such a determination."
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Thus, §32-2-10.1(12) goes too far in that it is
an attempt to regulate more than the Court in Miller allows
states to regulate.
far.

Similarly, §32-2-10.1(10) goes too

Referring back to the Miller substantive constitutional

limitations, it can be seen that sexual intercourse and
masturbation fit within those limits as "ultimate sexual
acts" but the touching aspects of the definition of sexual
conduct are clearly not ultimate sexual acts nor a lewd
exhibition of the genitals.

Therefore, in defining what

patently offensive descriptions are, §32-2-10.1(12) goes
too far.

Similarly, sado-masochistic abuse, found in

§32-2-10.1(10) is not defined in terms that Miller set
forth as substantive limitations.

As a result, the defini-

tions of obscene sexual conduct and sado-masochistic abuse
are an attempt to regulate material beyond the substantive
constitutional limits of the First Amendment and as such
are overly broad and invalid.
Further, the section defendant is charged with
violating, §32-2-10(3), is invalid as going beyond the
limits of Miller.

Before considering any tests of obscenity

the Court in Miller stated:
This case involves the application
of a state's criminal obscenity statute
to a situation in which sexually
explicit materials have been thrust
by aggressive sales actions upon
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unwilling recipients who had in no way
indicated any desire to receive such
material. This court has recognized
that states have a legitimate interest
in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the
mode of dissemination carries with it
a significant danger of offending the
sensibilities of unwilling recipients
or of exposure to juveniles. [Citing
cases]. It is in this context that
we are called on to define the standards
which must be used to identify obscene
material that a state may regulate without infringing the First Amendment as
applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
While defendant does not contend that the mere
fact that consenting adults are involved does not allow
regulation, see, Paris Adult Theater v. SIaton, 413 U.S.
49 (1973), our scheme of ordinances in no way limits its
purported operation to the context of either Miller or the
commercial exploitation stressed in Paris.

That is, our

ordinance purports to prohibit any "distribution" (defined
in §32-2-10.1(11) as a transfer of possession or a permission to be viewed with or without consideration) without
limiting the context to commercialized exploitation or to
any form of public accommodation.

Our ordinances give a

jury leeway to convict when a person distributes (allows
to be viewed without consideration) obscene matter to even
one person in the privacy of one's home.

In fact, since
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the ordinance applies to speaking as well as every other
-kind of possible communication, 5 32-2-10(6), "one could be
punished for swearing to himself if he should accidently
hit his thumb with a hammer" which was found objectionable
by t h i s Com t i n S a l t Lake C i t y v . D a v i s o n ,

P.2d 301 (1972).

27 Utah 2d 71, 493

As such, the Salt Lake City Ordinances

go beyond the context of the Miller and Paris

decisions

and purport to prohibit conduct that the Court was not even
remotely considering as conduct that could be regulated by
the states,,
Prior to the 1975 amendment of §32-2-10.1(14)
discussed in subpart C of this Point, i finding of obscenity
required a determination of whether the material was presented
in a patently offensive way which required the jury to
consider the context in which the film (or other material)
was shown as well as the material itself*

However this

requirement does not appear i n the current ordinance and
the jury need not consider whether the circumstances of
its "distribution" would be offensive.
i - Ji -1 .

A. _••;

That is, when con-

. * _-. ance of an "obscene" word violates

the ordinance, for example, the jury need not consider
whether it was uttered by a paratrooper11 going out the door
of an airplane or said over the public address system at
an elementary school.

Hence even the definition of "obscene"
-21-
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in §32-2-10.1(14) permits an overly broad application of
the ordinances.
Finally, the standing to attack the overbreadth
of the ordinance is not contingent on whether or not the
film which was shown was obscene.

The United States Supreme

Court has held that standing to challenge overly broad
statutes is not dependent on whether a defendant's conduct
could properly be made criminal under a statute rewritten
to comply with the Constitution.

In Bigelow v. Virginia,

421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222 (1975), the United States Supreme
Court struck down a Virginia statute which banned all manner
of abortion advertising.

The prosecution claimed that the

defendant's advertisement could be constitutionally proscribed
under a narrower statute and as a result the defendant lacked
standing to attack the overbreadth of the statute.

The

Court's reply was clear and very relevant to the present
case:
This Court often has recognized that
a defendant's standing to challenge
a statute on First Amendment grounds
as facially overbroad does not depend
upon whether his own activity is
shown to be constitutionally privileged.
421 U.S. at 809, 95 S.Ct. at 2229.
The Court cited numerous examples where standing to attack
statutes was granted to those who engaged in non-privileged
conduct.

Even if the film shown by defendant might be
-22-
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found obscene, nonetheless there is standing to attack the
overbreadth of the preset "rdinance.
B. The Overbreadth of the Ordinance
Cannot be Remedied by a Narrowing Judicial
Construction.
In denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the
complaint on the foregoing grounds, the District Court
below found the ordinance "constitutional as it conforms
to the Miller v. California guidelines.

And the Court

finds that that portion of the ordinance which does not
conform to the Miller v. California guidelines is unconstitutional."

(T-246)

The trial court did not specify

which portions were which, nor give an interpretation
setting out the language which survived the massive surgery.
Apparently, the court, in effect, repealed the lengthy
ordinance and attempted to substitute the holding of the
United States Supreme Court in Miller as the definition of
the prohibited conduct.

While Miller set some constitutional

parameters it; certainly did not: purport to amend legislation
by judicial fiat.

As stated by that Court:

f,

We emphasize

that it is not our function to propose regulatory schemes
for the States.
efforts."

That must await their concrete lesiglative

413 U.S. 15 (1973).
In Erznoznik v. "Jacksonville, supra:, the Supreme
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Court struck down an ordinance banning drive-in movies
containing nudity and the Court stated:
[A] state statute should not be
deemed facially invalid unless it
is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state
courts [citation omitted] and its
deterrent effect on legitimate
expression is both real and substantial. 422 U.S. at 216, 95
•S.Ct. at 2276.
The Court further held that a statute banning movies containing nudity was totally incapable of a constitutional
construction.

Under the provisions of Salt Lake City

Ordinance (Revised) §32-2-10(3), 10.1(8), and 10.1(7), the
city bans all films depicting "nudity" and does not require
or even consider a demonstration of appeal to prurient
interest, patent offensiveness, and lack of serious value.
As a result, the Salt Lake City ordinance is as incapable
of a constitutional construction as was the ordinance struck
down in Erznoznik.
If the court were asked to judicially read into
the ordinance an intent to apply the definition of "obscene"
[found in §32-2-10.1(14)] to the already defined ordinance
terms of "obscenities" and "obscene performance", two insurmountable problems would arise.

First, the court would

have to engage in impermissible judicial legislation.

When

the Salt Lake City Commission enacted this ordinance they
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enumerated within its provisions their clear intent that
movies depicting "obscenities" or an "obscene performance"
could be banned in_ addition to movies displaying "obscene
sexual conduct" or "obscene sado-masochistic abuse".
Commission's choice •_.

The

individually define the terms

"obscene performance" and "obscenities" was an unambiguous
expression of legislative intent to distinguish between
the different ways in which a film could be found in violation of the ordinance.

Any other reading of this ordinance

would render these detentions do useless surplusage in that
the definitions of "obscenities" and "obscene performance"
would not add any additional criteria to the test applied
through §32-2-10.1(14) (which defines "obscene").

In inter-

preting legislation, a basic rule has always been that a
iiourt cannot pi: esume ti lat a portion of a lesiglative act
was intended to be without effect.
5 U.S

Marbury v. Madison,

(1 Cranch) 1 37 (1 803); .Myers v. United States, 272

U.S. 52 (1926).

This principle was recently pointed out

by Mr. Justice Maughan in the case of State v. Phillips,
540 I '" 2- I 949 (Utah 1975) , where the Utah state obscenity
statute was challenged by a defendant book dealer:
j n or<jer to bring the statute into
conformance with the Miller standard
we would have to rewrite it; and
this no one will seriously advance
as a function of this court . . .
A concrete legislative effort is
not within the province of this
court. [Dissenting opinion] 540
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
P.2d
at Law
948.
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A further indication of legislative intent to
treat the four categories set out in §32-2-10 (3) as distinct
grounds for a violation of the ordinance is the act of the
Salt Lake City Commission of amending the definition of
"obscene" [found in §32-2-10.1(14)] to make it clear that
that definition not be superimposed on the existing definition of "obscene performance".

Prior to the amendments

of April 22, 1975, the definition of "obscene" began as
follows:
(14) Obscene shall mean an act,
depiction, representation, description, obscene performance, or any
other item, material or conduct in
this chapter described, whether
actual or simulated in form, which:
[violates the prurient interest,
patently offensive, serious value
test]. [Emphasis added.]
The amendments of April 22, 1975, were limited to amending
the definition of "obscene" found in §32-2-10.1(14).

The

only amendment affecting the portion quoted above was the
deletion of the term" obscene performance" and its substitution with the word "performance".
purpose

The only conceivable

for such a change would be to re-emphasize that

the definition of "obscene" found in §32-2-10.1(14) was
not to be superimposed upon the separately defined term of
"obscene performance" [defined in §32-2-10.1(8)].

The pre-

1975 ordinance established four separate sources for a
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violation of §32-2-10(3)

(i.e., movies displaying "obsceni-

ties", an "obscene performance", "obscene sexual conduct",
or "obscene sado-masochistic a b u s e " ) .
Commission V

Accordingly, the

1^75 amendment was not necessary to guarantee

the uniqur-;.£oi

:

•-. -

-^tegory.

However, the Commission's

1975 amendment does act to reaffirm their original legislative intent that the independently defined terms of "obscene performance" and "obscenities" are not subject to any
other qualifying definitions.
The; s e c on d b a r t o an in t e rp ret a t i o n w n

^o ul d

superimpose the definition of "obscene" on the separately
defined terms of "obscenities" and "obscene performance"
is that the definition of "obscene" itself is overly broad
and a jury would be so confused in applying "the law", as
to L>.~ incapable of rendering a constitutionally
verdict.

adequate

The United States Supreme Court recognized this

danger in Erznoznik, supra, where it declared:

•':...::j;*!}.:.--\

[Wjhere First Amendment freedoms are
at stake, we have repeatedly emphasized
that precision of drafting and clarity
of purpose are essential. 422 U.S
at 217, 218, 96 S.Ct. at 2277.

If the Salt Lake City ordinance were interpreted so as to
superimpose the tests of §32-2-10.1(14) on the definitions
found in §§3„-_«-.',, i

and

(9), it would lack the requisite

"precision of drafting and clarity of purpose" that are
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essential in order to comply with the Constitution.

Ac-

cordingly, no constitutionally sufficient narrowing construction of the ordinance is possible.
,.--,,.;*

C. Salt Lake City's Obscenity Ordinance
Violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments1
Guarantees of Due Process of Law Due to Its
Vagueness.
Salt Lake City Ordinance §32-2-10 is not only

overbroad, but is impermissibly vague as well.

The vague-

ness of the ordinance lies in the fact that the test for
defining patent offensiveness was redefined in the amendment
of April 22, 19 75, by deleting the requirement to apply
contemporary community standards as to what is or is not
patently offensive.

Prior to the 19 75 amendment, the

ordinance [§32-2-10.1(14)] test for patent offensiveness
was as follows:
..-•

|,

(14) Obscene shall mean [a] . . .
^depiction . . . which:
. . .(b) Is presented in a patently
offensive way by going substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in
description or representation of the
aforesaid matters in the community
[Emphasis added.] . . .

The 1975 amendment (which was in effect on the date of the
present complaint) repealed this language and substituted
a new test as follows:
i
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(14) Obscene shall mean [a] . , .
depiction
, , which:
• . . ( b ) Depicts, describes or
portrays sexual conduct, as defined
in subparagraph (12) above, in a
patently offensive way . . .
What has resulted is a removal of the standard by which a
trier of fact must determine patent offensiveness.

Under

this new definition, a juror may apply whatever standards
he wants to, regardless of whether he thinks they are representative of the community as a whole.

If a juror of

abnormal sensitivity is "patently offended" by a film, he
does not need to look to what a majority of persons in the
community would find patently offensive.

Under the amended

ordinance he is given no guidelines as to whose standards
of "patent offensiveness" should be applied.

Consequently,

there is no requirement that contemporary community standards
be applied in determining what is or is not "patently offensive11,.

In Miller v. California, supra, the Supreme Cour t

required that the prurient interest-, patently offensive,
serious value requirements must a n be determined by "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards".
The Court gave the following reason for its requirement:
[T]he primary concern with requiring
a jury to apply the standard of "the
average person, applying contemporary
community standards" is to be certain
that, so far as material is not aimed
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at a deviant group, it will be judged
by its impact on an average person,
rather than a particularly susceptible
or sensitive person—or indeed a totally
insensitive one, 413 U.S. at 33, 93
S.Ct. at 2620.

x

Further, the United States Supreme Court in
Hamling v. United States, 94 S.Ct. 2884, 2901 (1974), in
discussing whether nationwide standards or local community
standards were required to determine what is "obscene",
said that a juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge
"of the views of the average person in the community or
visinage from which he comes for making the required determination, just as he is entitled to draw on his knowledge
of the propensities of a 'reasonable person1 in other areas
of the law."

The court therein later stated that the result

of the Miller case as a matter of constitutional law is to
let a juror sitting in obscenity cases to draw on knowledge

(

of the community or visinage from which he comes in deciding
what conclusion "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would reach in a given case.

Thus,

|

the court did not in Hamling limit the contemporary community
standards aspect to the first element of the three-prong
Miller test, but indicated that a juror is entitled to draw

(

on his knowledge of the average person applying contemporary
community standards in reaching a decision on obscenity.
<
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The clear implication of such language in Hamling is that
the jury is to apply the standard of the average person
applying contemporary community standards not only to the
first prong of the Miller test, whether something appeals
to the prurient interest, but also to the other two prongs,
whether something is patently offensive and whether it lacks
serious value.
Since the amended ordinance does not provide
guidelines as to what standards should be applied in determining whether a film is "patently offensive11, the theater
operator is left unprotected against arbitrary and unrepresentative verdicts.

Accordingly, the definition of the term

"obscene" found in §32-2-10.1(14) violates the defendant's
right tu due ufuces^

or lc. AV. ^ r ^-t be found unconstitutional

on its face.
POINT II
SALT LAKE ciTY f S ORDINANCE ON ITS FACE VIOLATES
SECTION 15 OF ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
.• .

Sect: 01 i 15 of Article I of the Constitut i on of

Utah states:
No law shall be passed to abridge
or restrain the freedom of speech
or of the press. In all criminal
prosecutions for libel the truth
may be given in evidence to the
jury; and if it shall appear to
the jury that the matter charged
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.

as libelous is true, and was published
with good motives, and for justifiable
ends, the party shall be acquitted; and
the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact. (Emphasis
added.)

The clear import of the words is that with the
exception of libel, a specific interference with the rights
of another, no law shall be passed to abridge or restrain
the freedom of speech or of the press.

While the First

Amendment contains similar, seemingly clear language, and
the United States Supreme Court has seen fit over the years
to read into that clear language an exception as to
"obscenity", there is no reason that this Court should
similarly amend the Constitution of Utah.

It should be
i

noted that this Court has often criticized the United States
Supreme Court for interpreting the United States Constitution
contrary to its plain language.

It should also be noted

that the Supreme Court of the United States carved the
"obscenity" exception to the clear "no law" provision of
the First Amendment during an era when sex was practically
unanimously considered a taboo subject.

Surely, today,

there is no rational reason as opposed to reasons deriving
from faith, to compel infusing a nonexistent exception
into Section 15, Article I, for communications concerning
sex and not for violence, for example, which today is
t
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generally regarded as more evil than sex.
This Court in State v, Phillips, 540 P.2d 936
(Utah 1975), held that Section 1, Article I, was not
violated by an anti-pornography statute and that freedom
of expression is not an absolute.

However, the Court did

not address itself to the language of Section 15, Article
I which is stated in absolute prohibitory terms in contrast
to the general statement of principles of Section 1.
Section 15 says no law; it does not say no unreasonable
law, or, no law except those thought necessary to protect
"morals" or "normal sensibilities".

The framers of the

Cons titut ion spoke i n abso 1 ute terms when it came to freedom
of speech and the press.
Even if "no law" does noc mean absolutely "no law
except libel" this Court should limit any exception it deems
necessary to create.
said:

In Phillips, supra, at 9 39, it was

"[W]e have no desire t;:o disparage the Idea that every

person should have the highest possible degree of freedom
of thought, expression and action consistent with respecting
similar rights In other individual, ^ , -..e *eifcir-:>
society generally."

The ordinances, under which defendant

wa s co n vieted, a re certainly not drawn so as to maximi ze
freedom of thought and expression regarding
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sex.

It can be intelligently argued that the thrusting
of offensive material of any kind upon another infringes
that person's rights.
protecting children.

Similarly a case can be made for
But to prohibit what is communicated

to consenting adults, even in private places as the ordinances
do, is certainly a different matter and can only be justified
upon the vague grounds of protecting "morals".
In his concurring opinion in State v. Musser, 223
P.2d 193 (Utah 1950), Mr. Justice Latimer stated:
In the final analysis, each
individual has his own moral
codes, private and public, and
what acts might be considered
as injurious to public morals
are as numerous as the opinions
of man. 223 P. 2d at 196".
The variety in opinions as what is or is not moral is even
greater today than when Mr. Justice Latimer made the foregoing statement in 1950.
To create an exception to Section 15, Article I,
where a legislature deems it fitting to protect the public
morals is to open a pandora's box.

Given the right political

makeup, a legislature might decide to prohibit offensive
speech or film which might encourage large families, or
small ones; war or pacificism; abortion or the forced bearing
of an unwanted child.

To say that the exception will be

limited to those expressions which in a jury's view lack
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serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value
is no real protection because only the most sophisticated
of philosophers will attribute any value to that which he
regards as being immoral.

Values vary as much as do morals,

since the latter is derived from 'the former.
An argument may also be made that "pornography"
does not involve the expression of ideas and hence the
"freedom of speech", being for the purpose of facilitating
exchange of ideas, is not involved at all.

That might be

so if "pornography" or "obscenity11 is defined as s omething
that does not convey thought.

(Such a definition might

be difficult, however, since thought can be affected by
emotional response—for example, the purely emotional
response to a symphony or abstract painting that conveys
no specific idea.)

However, the instant ordinance is not

limited to material which does not express ideas.

Even

the proseci it ion wi *•- ^ss*-/- --:*~:'t*.'

v - film s h o w n in t h e

instant case had a serious theme.

(T-104, 237, 24 0)

Their

opinion was that the amount of explicit sex was "disproport i o n a t e " , (T - 81 i ] 0 5 ,, 2 3 7) wh i ch o £ f e n d e d the i r a e s t he t i c
sense a n d h e n c e l e d them to the opinion that it lacked
" s e r i o u s artistic v a l u e " .

Under I n s t r u c t i o n 17 yiven in

this c a s e , the jury w a s p e r m i t t e d to convict even if t h e film
involved a c l e a r e x p r e s s i o n o f ideas if the jury nonetheless
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found it to be "obscene" as defined by the court.
It is respectfully submitted that the instant
ordinance is a law which abridges and restrains the freedom
of speech and of the press and, as such, is in direct
violation of Section 15, Article I of the Constitution of
Utah.
POINT III
THE SALT LAKE CITY OBSCENITY ORDINANCES VIOLATE
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE EQUAL APPLICATION
OF THE LAWS PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
Section 32-2-10.2, Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake City, after exempting possession and distribution
of obscenity by persons involved in law enforcement, research, etc., where such possession or distribution is not
related to the appeal to prurient interest, goes on to
state:
In addition, nothing in this chapter
shall apply to any recognized historical society or museum, the state
law library, any county or city or
town law library, the state library,
the public library, any library of
any college or university or to any
archive or library under the supervision and control of the state,
county, municipality or other political
subdivision, or to any similar organization or institution of the same
class. (Emphasis added.)
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It should be noted that this exemption is not limited in
any way to any purpose but would allow any

recognized

(whatever that means) historical society, for example,
to display a clearly obscene motion picture for profit
3.nd under ci rcurnstances c] ear 1 y i ndicat Ing an appeal to
prurient interest.

While the exemption pertaining to

possession and distribution for law enforcement,

research,

etc,, purposes not involvi ng an appeal to prurient interest,
may be a reasonable classification related to the overall
purpose of the act, the second, qi loted port! on, is • ilearly
not.

Those organizations and institutions are simply

and

arbitrarily permitted to commit the same acts, for the same
reasons, and with the same supposed damage to the public
morals which are forbidden to all other persons and instill utioins simi 1 ar 1 y situated.

Th Is Court h as repeatedly

held where there is no fair reason, related to the purposes
Q£

the

actf

that would not require equally its extension

to those it leaves untouched, the act is in violation of
the Constitution.

See, e_.£. / Broadbent v. Gibson, 105

I Jtah 53, ] .4 0 P. 2d 9 3' * (.] 94 3) ; Gronlund v. Salt Lak e City,
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d

464

(1948),

It is difficult to

conceive of any fair reason to allow a historical society
or museum to exhibit an obscene motion picture and outlaw'
the exhibition of the same motion picture under the same
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circumstances by any other person or organization.
POINT IV
THE SALT LAKE CITY OBSCENITY ORDINANCES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN THE INSTANT
CASE.
: Assuming for the argument of this point that the
ordinances in question are constitutional on their face, the
conviction in the instant case should be reversed because
the trial court failed to implement them in such a way as
to afford defendant the constitutionally mandated protections
contained within the ordinances.
First, the trial court defined "obscenity" in the
language of the ordinance, that is, without specifying any
standard for determining whether the movie depicted sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way and whether, taken as
a whole, it lacked serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value.

(Instruction No. 19, R-96)

{

The only

objective standard, concerning an average person applying
contemporary community standards, was. applied solely to the

<

first element regarding appeal to prurient interest, leaving
the jury free to apply their own subjective views regarding
whether it was offensive or had serious value.

As argued

i

in Point I, this clearly violates the First Amendment of
the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the
r

,-'..,

•

•.

-

•••-

'
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•

<

United States.

E.g., Hamling v. United States, 94 S.Ct.

2884, 2901 (1974).

Further, in the event this Court does

find an "obscenity " exception to Section 15, Article I,
of the Constitution of Utah, such an exception would surely
be tied to some objective standard rather than permitting
each jury to decide for themselves whether in their subjective opinion a particular

work was obscene.

It would seem axiomatic that it is not sufficient
for an ordinance to contain protections and a court to instruct
on them, if a defendant is not allowed to introduce evidence
to attempt to convince a jury that he comes within those
protections.

In other words the constitutionally mandated

protections, such as they are in the instant ordinance,
can be, and were in the instant case, nullified by evidentiary
rulings of the trial court.
The trial court did allow both the prosecution
and defense to present evidence regarding the literary and
artistic value of the film, but that court refused the defense proffers of proof regarding the appeal to prurient
interest and the o::-:nsiveness of the film.
First the defense sought to introduce an opinion
poll regarding the attitudes of people in the community
regarding films containing explicit sex, and the prosecution
objected prior to the completion of the foundation,
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(T-123,25)

After argument, in the absence of the jury, the objection
was sustained because "the probative value is not sufficient."
(T-130)

A proffer was made as to the foundation and the

results which showed that 79% of the population of the
community indicated that they were not offended by the
displaying of "hard core pornography" in a theater where
patrons were forewarned, juveniles were excluded and there
was no external display of offensive materials.

(T-131)

While it is true that §76-10-1203(3), O.C.A.
(Supp. 1975) and §32-10-10.3, Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake City, do not require the prosecution to introduce
evidence as to the community standard regarding the appeal
to prurient interest and the offensiveness, and juries have
been

held capable of determining those standards from their

own knowledge, e.g., Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 56 (1973), it does not follow that the defense does

{

not have the right to introduce evidence regarding what the
community standards are.
When the views of the public at large are relevant,

{

opinion polls based upon sufficient foundation are admissible
to prove what those views are.

Zippo Mfgr. Co. v. Rodgers

Imports, Inc., 216 F.Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
When the "community standard" is involved, as
it is in obscenity cases, it is hard to conceive of more
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reliable evidence than properly conducted polls except
for calling all the citizens of the community as witnesses.
Such polls have been received into evidence in California
obscenity trials.

Pines, The Obscenity Quagmire, CAL.

STATE BAR J. 561 (Nov./Dec. 1974).
The importance of evidence concerning the views
of the public regarding sexual material is made obvious
by the finding, itself based upon opinion polls, of the
Presidential and Congressional Commission on Obscenity
that:
Americans also seem to have an
inaccurate view of the opinions
of others in their communities;
the tendency is to believe that
others in the community are more
restrictive in outlook than they
actually are. REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND
PORNOGRAPHY 43 (U.S. Gov. P.O.
1970).
It is no wonder that the prosecution would rather juries
rely on their own knowledge of community beliefs rather
than scientifically determined evidence.

The would-be

suppressors of sexual frankness have been all too successful in convincing the great majority of people that their
actual views are held by only a small minority of sinners.
It is undoubtedly difficult for a juror to express his
belief that the community is not offended by even "hard
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core pornography" when he has been subjected to the public
statements of religious leaders and politicians that society
is almost unanimously offended by the existence of such
material.

The fact that the statements of such leaders

are simply not true is not only relevant to the issue of
"community standards" but also reduces the pressure on
jurors to conform to a mistaken belief as to what the
community demands.
The defense also sought to have described, and
introduced for comparison purposes, three other motion
pictures which had been either prosecuted and acquitted or
dismissed by the prosecution, the sole issue in each case
being the obscenity of the film.

(T-140, T-150,51)

Only

films involved in cases where respondent and appellant
were parties and the sole issue was whether the film was
obscene were offered in evidence.

The defense sought to

introduce these materials not only as evidence to be considered by the jury in determining what materials are
i

accepted in the community, (See, £.£. , Woodruff v. State,
273 A.2d 436, 447 (Md. 1971); In Re Harris, 336 P.2d 305
(Cal. 1961); Devitt & Blacker, Fed. Jury Instructions Sec.
41.09, p. 521), but also to allow the jury to rely on precedent to develop a standard upon which defendant and others
could rely in the future.

The courts have given juries in
-42-
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obscenity cases an unusual amount of discretion.

If that

discretion is exercised completely on an ad. hoc basis by
each jury, it is impossible to predict what films are
permissible to show.

This not only raises vagueness problems

in violation of both State and Federal Constitutions but
has a great potential "chilling effect" on the exercise
of the freedom of expression.

If the defendant, and others,

cannot safely rely on a series of findings of non-obscenity,
and show films clearly less offensive and prurient than
those previously tried, the only safe course is to not
show films containing any sexual material.
It is submitted that the freedom of expression
provisions of both State and Federal Constitutions are not
satisfied by a statutory provision that films which do not
violate community standards are protected, when the trial
court will not permit the defendant to produce evidence
regarding what those community standards actually are.
POINT V
THE SALT LAKE CITY OBSCENITY ORDINANCES AS APPLIED
IN THE INSTANT CASE ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BECAUSE THE FILM EXHIBITED
BY THE DEFENDANT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IS NOT OBSCENE MATERIAL.
While the United States Supreme Court in Miller,
supra, indicated that the determination of obscenity was
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essentially a matter of fact, that court subsequently in
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974), stated that
it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that
juries have unbridled discretion in determining the existence of the elements of obscenity.

The court held that it

was the duty of appellate courts to conduct an independent
review of constitutional claims when necessary, even though
a properly charged jury unanimously agreed on a verdict of
guilty.

418 U.S. at 160.

In this regard,•§32-2-10, Revised

Ordinances of Salt Lake City, which makes the judge or jury
the sole trier of what is obscene is clearly unconstitutional.
Appellant introduced considerable evidence at
the trial that the film in question not only had serious
literary and artistic value

but also that the erotic appeal

(i.e., the "prurient appeal") had obviously been sacrificed
in order to establish the serious theme of the film.

Ap-

pellant submits to this Court that because the film, taken
as a whole, has serious literary and artistic value, it is,
as a matter of law, protected by the First Amendment and
that this Court must therefore review the determination of
the jury.

Otherwise, the defendant will be deprived of the

protection of appellate review held constitutionally necessary in Jenkins, supra.

I
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POINT VI
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL
JURY AS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH.
A. This Court has the Power to Review Cases
Originating in City Court, Despite Article VIII,
Section 9, Constitution of Utah, Where an Irregularity in the Proceedings Amounting to a Significant
Invasion of a Constitutional Right has Occurred.
While Article VIII, Section 9, of the Constitution
of Utah limits appeals of cases originating in a city court
to cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a
statute, and this Court has ruled many times that other
ordinary claims of error cannot be reviewed by this Court,
e.g., Salt Lake City v. Peters, 16 Utah 2d 245, 398 P.2d
88 8 (1965), this Court has never resolved the problem regarding appeal of such convictions where a violation of
another specific constitutional provision amounting to a
denial of due process has occurred.
In

State v. Lyte, 75 Utah 283, 284 Pac. 1006 (1930),

the defendant in a misdemeanor case attempted to appealf
alleging the introduction of evidence concerning other crimes
amounted to a violation of the protection against double
jeopardy.

This Court did not summarily dismiss the appeal

because the validity of a statute was not involved.

Rather,

the Court analyzed the arguments of the defendant and determined that the rulings of the court, while erroneous did not

-4 5-
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constitute double jeopardy.

The Court, however, did not

reach the question of its power to consider appeals where
a violation of a constitutional right has occurred, saying:
If therefore the rulings complained
of do not involve jeopardy, there is
no necessity to here consider our
power, in such a case as now before
us—where judgment of the district
court is final and non-appealable—
to grant relief when constitutional
rights in such particular are invaded.
284 Pac. 25 1007.
However the Court did imply that there may be circumstances
in addition to the unconstitutionality of the statute where
review by this Court would be proper.
However, since the rulings do not
involve questions on which an appeal
may be taken, nor jurisdiction of
the court, nor regularity of its
proceedings, but mere questions
as to the admissability of evidence . . . the appeal must be
dismissed. 284 Pac. at 1008.
(Emphasis added.)
The instant case places the question left open
in Lyte, supra, squarely before the Court, for as argued
in subpoint B, infra, the denial of the right to an impartial jury does clearly amount to a question affecting
the "regularity of the proceedings" and "jurisdiction of
the court".
The issue is actually one of an apparent conflict
in two provisions of the Constitution, Article VIII, Section
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9

and Article I, Section 12.

It is respectfully submitted

that this conflict should be resolved in favor of the inherent power of this Court to enforce the protections
guaranteed defendants in the Constitution.

Article VIIIf

Section 9 does, itself, guarantee the right to a de novo
trial in the district court which implicitly guarantees a
trial meeting the requirements of due process of law including
the submission of the facts to an untainted jury.

For

example, if the district court, in violation of Article VIII,
Section 9 should deny a defendant a trial at all and convict
him summarily, it could hardly be argued that the same
Article would deprive the defendant of any avenue of relief
in this Court.
It is respectfully submitted that the provision
against further appeal of a misdemeanor case in Article VIII
assumes a trial in district court which was in accordance
with Article I, Section 12 and that the defendant was accorded
due process of law there.

However, where the defendant was

denied the right to an impartial jury, this assumption is
invalid and it is necessry for this Court to provide relief, '
not only to enforce Article I, Section 12, but also to give
validity to the right to trial in district court contained in
Article VIII, Section 9.

-47-
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B. The Receipt of Information Outside of
Court by Seven Jurors Which Did, or Could Have,
Influenced Their Verdict Amounted to a Denial
of the Right to an Impartial Jury.
In denying defendant's motion for a mistrial based
on the improper conveying of information to members of the
jury (T-252) and in the motion for a mistrial on the same
grounds, (R-392) the trial court indicated that there was a
lack of evidence that the information had influenced the jury.
The Court, after interviewing the two jurors who had learned
of the investigation, indicated he was not satisfied that
this knowledge had not affected the jury (T-167), and on
other occasions indicated his concern as to the possible
effect.

(T-4, 18, 92, 158, 165, 251)

It is apparent that

the trial court believed the test to be, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, that improper [and the trial court did
find that the statements by one of the attorneys for plaintiff
i

to the press were improper, (T-158)] communications to a
jury are presumed to be nonprejudicial and that the jury is
to have presumed to follow the instructions to only consider
the evidence.
This is not the law in Utah.

In State v. Thorne,

39 Utah 208, 117 Pac. 58 (1911), a juror had merely made a
phone call without permission after the case had been submitted to the jury.

There was no evidence whatsoever as to

with whom he had conversed or the subject matter.
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This

^

Court in reversing the conviction held:
From the misconduct disclosed and
the exposure of the juror to harmful
influences, prejudice is presumed,
and the burden cast on the state to
show what the communication was, and
that it was harmless and could not
have influenced or affected the deliberations of the juror or his verdict. 117 Pac. at 66. (Emphasis
added.)
•

*

*

To say that the accused
cannot sustain his claim of prejudice until he also shows that the
juror talked about something harmful
to the accused's rights is to fritter
away the constitutional and statutory
provisions requiring the jury to be
kept secluded from all influences.
It is enough that the state, to
sustain the verdict against the
accused under such circumstances,
is permitted to show that the conduct, though wrongful and in disobedience of the statute and the
directions of the court, nevertheless was harmless, by showing all
that was said and done, and by clearly
and affirmatively showing that the
accused was not, nor could have been,
prejudiced thereby. The state not
having done this, is not entitled to
hold the verdict. 117 Pac. at 67.
(Emphasis added.)
In State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 Pac. 941
(1925), a juror had been given a ride back and forth to
court by one of the complaining witnesses.

The trial court

was satisfied that there was no intention to influence the
juror and affidavits by the juror and witness declared that
there had been no conversation concerning the case and that
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the courtesy extended to the juror had in no way affected
his decision.

In reversing the conviction on the grounds

the defendant had been denied trial by an impartial jury in
violation of Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution, the
Court stated:
The authorities, however, all agree
that any conduct or relationship
between a juror and a party to an
action during the trial that would
or might, consciously or unconsciously, tend to influence the judgment of
the juror authorizes and requires the
granting of a new trial, unless it is
made to appear affirmatively that the
judgment of the juror was in no way
affected by such relationship or that
the parties by their conduct waived
their right to make objection to such
conduct. 237 Pac. at 943. (Emphasis
added.)
In

State v. Ahrens, 25 U.2d 222, 479 P.2d 786

(1971), the court held that the unauthorized viewing by a
juror of a city office where an embezzlement was alleged
to have occurred and some conversation with the employees
there required reversal,

i^ccording to the dissenting

opinion, the juror saw nothing and learned nothing that
the rest of the jury did not see and learn during the
course of the trial and during an official view.
Court nonetheless stated:
We have no way of determining
whether or not the conduct of the
juror influenced his judgment in
arriving at a verdict. We adhere
to the rule stated in prior decisions of the court that the law
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This

requires of the juror such conduct
during the trial that his verdict
may be above suspicion as to having
been influenced by any conduct on
his part during the trial. 25 U.2d
at 225.
It can hardly be argued that these cases are distinguishable on the grounds that, in the instant case, the
misconduct was on the part of a prosecutor rather than of
the jurors.

The effect on the jury is the same, and, if

misconduct is relevant, it would seem that misconduct by a
prosecutor, supposedly familiar with proper procedures and
a duty to insure fairness, is considerably more serious
than similar conduct by a layman.

In State v. Maynard, 9

Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884 (1959), the actions of the trial
court in communicating with a deliberating jury in the
absence of counsel was held to be an improper violation of
privacy of the jury designed to preserve it from outside
influence.
It is therefore clear that when an impropriety
regarding a jury occurs, the issue is not whether the jury
has been shown to be influenced, but whether they could
have been influenced, consciously or unconsciously.
Here, at least four, if not five, jurors had been
made aware that the Attorney Generalfs Office through the
L.D.S. Church had made inquiry to see if they were "pro
or anti-pornography".

That is, they were made aware that
-51-
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both church and state were watching them.

They were further

informed that, as a result of this inquiry, five of them
were expected to be favorable to the prosecution and two were
expected to not acquit no matter what happened at the trial.
(Transcript of television newscast, Exhibit 13D)

To say

that jurors would not be at least subconsciously influenced
by the fact that their bishop was expecting them to convict
is not only speculative but ignores the realities of human
nature.

The prosecutor's comment also assumed that an ac-

quittal would only be returned by a person who was propornography which certainly might have an effect on a juror
who was opposed to "pornography" but harbored a doubt as to
whether the film was legally obscene.

{

In addition, the juror who was informed by a
neighbor that the Attorney General's Office wanted to know
if she partied a lot or was a good girl might certainly feel

<

pressure to keep her reputation as a good girl by deciding
in accordance with what was impliedly a good girl's duty.
Similarly, can it be said with confidence that the juror

4

who heard of the investigation by way of his ward secretary
would feel no unconsious pressure?
Running through all the cases is the concern for

^

not only actual fairness but the appearance of fairness.
For example, in State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178
i
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(1943), it was said:

"The verdict of the jury, like Caesar's

wife, must be above suspicion,"
It certainly did not give the defendant confidence
in the fairness of the jury, to have the prosecutor publicly
announce, prior to the jury hearing the evidence, that the
jury was pro-prosecution.

But of more importance is the

confidence of the public regarding a trial which, not only
was given wide publicity, but involved issues concerning the
community as a whole.

Even a columnist for the Deseret News,

which was hardly sympathetic to the defense, (see Exhibits
1D-7D) commented in reference to Prosecutor Hansen's prediction:
"If two jurors had their minds made up before the trial even
started, the proceedings can hardly be called fair."

Decker,

A Tainted Porn Jury?, Deseret News, July 2, 19 76, p. A4.
The Constitutional Law of this state is clear
that a defendant has an absolute right to a jury which is
clearly free from even the possibility of outside influence.
It is respectfully submitted that a jury which has been
informed that they are expected to acquit if they are moral
people cannot be presumed to be free of conscious or unconscious influence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully
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submitted that
be

t h e judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t

should

reversed.

Respectfully

submitted,

/JOHN D. O'CONNELL
Attorney for Appellant
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APPENDIX A
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City (19 75)
Sec. 32-2-10.

Obscene or lewd acts and prepara-

tion and dissemination of obscene materials or hard-core
pornography—"hard-core pornography" defined.

It shall be

unlawful for any person willfully or knowingly to either:
(1) Associate in a lewdf lascivious or obscene
manner with any person, whether married or unmarried, engage
in open and gross lewdness, lascivious or obscene conduct,
or make any open, public, indecent or obscene exposure of
his or her private parts, or the person or private parts of
another; or
(2) Procure, counsel or assist any person: (a)
To act in a lewd or obscene manner; (b) To engage in obscene
sexual conduct, an obscene performance or obscene sadomasochistic abuse; or (c) To make any indecent exposure of
his own or any other person's private parts; or
(3) Import, write, compose, stereotype, print,
design, copy, draw, paint or otherwise prepare, publish,
sell, offer for sale, display, exhibit by machine or otherwise or distribute or furnish any writing, paper, book,
picture, drawing, magazine, pamphlet, print, design, figure,
still or motion picture, photograph or negative thereof,
photocopy, engraving, sound recording, card, instrument or
other such article which depicts or represents or describes
obscene sexual conduct, an obscene performance, obscenities
or obscene sado-masochistic abuse with the intent to distribute the same.
(4) Buy, procure, receive or have in his possession
any such writing, paper, book, picture, drawing, magazine,
pamphlet, print, design, figure, still or motion picture,
photograph or negative thereof, photocopy, engraving, sound
recording, card, instrument or other article which depicts
or represents or describes obscene sexual conduct, an obscene
performance, obscenities, or obscene sado-masochistic abuse
with the intent to distribute the same; or
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(5) Write, compose or publish, display publicly
or permit to be displayed any notice or advertisement for
any writing, paper, book, picture, drawing, magazine, pamphlet, print, design, figure, still or motion picture, photograph or negative thereof, photocopy, engraving, sound
recording, card, instrument or other article which depicts
or represents or describes obscene sexual conduct, an obscene
performance, or obscene sado-masochistic abuse or any obscenities for advertising purposes; or
(6) Sing or speak an obscene or lewd song, ballad,
or any other obscenity 03: lewd words in any public place or
in the presence of other persons; or
(7) Require as a condition to a sale, allocation,
consignment or delivery for resale of any paper, magazine,
book, periodical, publication, or other merchandise, that the
purchaser or consignee receive any material, which material
is obscene or is believed by the purchaser or consignee to
be obscene or to deny or threaten to deny a franchise or
license, or revoke or threaten to revoke, or impose any
penalty, financial or otherwise, by reason of the failure or
refusal of such purchaser or consignee to accept such material
or to do such acts by reason of the return of such material.
Sec. 32-2-10.1

Definitions.

As used in this

chapter, unless the content requires otherwise:
(1) Willfully shall mean simply a purpose or
willingness to commit the act or to omit an act required herein.
(2) Knowingly shall mean to have actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the subject matter.
A person has constructive knowledge if a reasonable inspection
under the circumstances would have disclosed the nature of
the subject matter and if the failure to inspect is for the
purpose of avoiding such disclosure.
(3) Advertising purposes shall mean purposes of
propagandizing in connection with the commercial sale of a
product or type of product, the commercial offering of a
service or the commercial e^diibition of an entertainment.
(4) Displays publicly shall mean the exposing,
placing, posting, exhibiting, or in any fashion displaying
in any location, whether public or private, an item in a
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manner that it may be readily seen and its content or character distinguished by normal unaided vision viewing it from
a public thoroughfare, depot or vehicle.
(5) p e r s o n shall not be limited to individuals
only but shall include public and private corporations, firms,
joint associations, partnerships and the like. The word
"person" as used herein shall apply to a natural person and
shall apply equally to the male and female genders.
(6) Furnishes means to sell, give, rent, loan or
otherwise provide.
(7) Nudity means uncovered, or less than opaquely
covered, human genitals, pubic areas, the human female
breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola,
or the covered human male genitals in a discernibly turgid
state. For purposes of this definition, a female breast is
considered uncovered if the nipple only or the nipple and
areola only are covered.
(8) Obscene performance means a play, motion
picture, dance, show or other presentation, whether pictured,
animated or live, performed before an audience and which in
whole or in part depicts or reveals nudity, sexual conduct,
sexual excitement or sado-masochistic abuse, or which includes
obscenities or explicit verbal description or narrative
accounts of sexual conduct.
(9) Obscenities means those slang words currently
generally rejected for regular use in mixed society, that are
used to refer to genitals, female breasts, sexual conduct or
excretory functions or products, either that have no other
meaning or that in context are clearly used for their bodily,
sexual or excretory meaning.
(10) Sado-masochistic abuse means flagellation or
torture by or upon a person who is nude or clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume, or the condition
of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained
on the part of one so clothed.
(11) Distribute means to transfer possession of
or permit to be viewed, heard or examined, with or without
consideration.
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(12) Sexual conduct means human masturbation,
sexual intercourse or any""touching of the covered or uncovered genitals, human female breast, pubic areas or
buttocks of the human male or female, whether alone or
between members of the same or opposite sex or between
humans and animals in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification, which term shall include, but not
be limited to fellatio, cunnilingus, pederasty and bestiality.
(13) Sexual excitement means the condition of
human male or female genitals or the breasts of the female
when in a state of sexual stimulation, or the sensual experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct
or nudity.
(-1-4) Obscene shall mean an act, depiction, representation, description, performance, or any other item,
material or conduct in this chapter described, whether
actual or simulated in form, which:
(a) Taken as a whole, the average person would
find appeals to the prurient interest when applying contemporary community standards; and

(

(b) Depicts, describes or portrays sexual conduct,
as defined in subparagraph (12) above, in a patently
offensive way; and
(c) Taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value,

i

(15) Prurient interest shall mean a shameful or
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion.
Section 32-2-10.2.
exempted from ordinance.

Persons and institutions

i

This ordinance shall not apply

to persons who may possess and distribute obscene material
or participate in the other conduct which is proscribed when

^

such possession, distribution, or participation occurs in
the course of bona fide educational, artistic, scientific,

I
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medical, or comparable research or study or in the course
of law enforcement activities or in other like circumstances where the nature of possession, distribution, or
participation is not related to the appeal to prurient
interest; in addition, nothing in this chapter shall apply
to any recognized historical society or museum, the state
law library, any county or city or town law library, the
state library, the public library, any library of any college
or university or to any archive or library under the supervision and control of the state, county, municipality or
other political subdivision, or to any similar organization
or institution of the same class.
Section 32-2-10.3.

Sole trier.

The judge or the

jury shall be the sole trier of what is obscene.
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